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Desperate Mobilities: Logistics, Security and the Extra-Logistical Knowledge of 'Appropriation'

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This paper sets out to address the increasing strategic power of logistics management in the context of commodity and corporeal mobilities. In doing so it looks to the strategy of interconnectivity *in order to address the management of legitimated mobilities. It is argued that the geopower of commodity mobility is premised on the infrastructural strength offered by logistics management, a form of spatial and temporal control that operates through increasingly territorialising means. However, given the infrastructural 'tension' that processes of standardisation have created, the paper also concerns the appropriation of commodity mobility networks for the purposes of illegitimated corporeal mobility. In part this is intended to develop the critiques of globalisation which challenged the image of transnational mobility networks as part of a borderless, boundless present typified most readily by the flows of information, capital and commodities. By contrast the 'desperate mobilities' of undocumented immigrants attests to the rather more tangled manifestations of mobility that many individuals have to traverse. In particular I focus on the fallibility of strategic sites within global commodity movement and the uses of 'extra-logistical knowledge'.*

INTRODUCTION

Recent figures suggest that some 300 million shipping containers are currently in circulation across the world's oceans.[1] The sheer quantity of these standardised units is testament to the importance of global trade, but more critically the infrastructural power and efficiencies which lie behind such

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circulation. However, the abundance and ubiquity of shipping containers accounts for unintended consequences. The US-sponsored Container Security Initiative "is a multinational program protecting the primary system of global trade – containerized shipping – from being exploited or disrupted by international terrorists".[2] Instituted in January 2002, (post 9/11), CSI attempts to project risk from containerised shipping outside of US border space, by locating security checks on shipping containers at their port of origin before they are loaded onto US-bound vessels. In similar terms, the International Ship & Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), published in 2004 by the International Maritime Organization, sets out guidelines for protecting global trade including the need to secure infrastructure, with port spaces a particular focus.[3] These two initiatives highlight an intrinsic relationship between global commodity networks and the potential infiltration by 'forces' deemed hostile to their continuous operation.

In part, this paper seeks to deal with the disruption of mobility networks. It is concerned with the use of global commodity networks for purposes outside of those intended, specifically various forms of undocumented migration, including people smuggling.[4] Such attempts to infiltrate the transnational networks of commodity mobility are at odds to certain images of global mobilities as frictionless, unfettered flow.[5] This image of supposed ease is applied most commonly to the mobility of information, capital and commodities, whereas the discourse on corporeal mobility is decidedly more fraught. Transnational undocumented immigration is one of the most contested aspects of global mobility, often rendered as the dark side[6] or "underbelly"[7] of globalisation. In the context of migration a key question is that of *access*: how certain groups are denied access to mobility through dint of birthplace, ethnic profiling or geopolitical circumstance. According to Väyrynen, "Illegal migration cannot be separated either from the larger dynamics of the global economy nor the policies pursued by governments."[8] The labelling of illegality forced onto these people creates the need to employ *actual* forms of illegality, such as the use of smuggling syndicates. The practices of smuggling syndicates, or indeed those of individual stowaways, are typified by tactical methods of infiltrating or appropriating already existing mobilities, including commodity flows. This is a primary focus of the paper. I also want to address the relationship between the efficiencies that typify commodity mobility (in the form of logistics and supply chain management) and the illicit use of these self-same efficiencies. In doing so I consider how the mechanisms developed under the rubric of logistics are premised on a specific ideology of spatial and temporal control. Through this I outline a reading of geopower as the management and control of sanctioned mobilities via specific techniques and practices of interconnection. In particular the paper deals with the importance of controlling and stabilising the interconnections between the vehicles used to

transport goods, storage sites, and strategically critical areas such as port spaces. This is an ideology that is determined by making space legible and calculable. However, as the acts of stowing away illustrate, the interactions of the network are inherently unstable. I suggest that interconnectivity is both a decisive factor for global commodity mobilities but also an example of structural fallibility.

The overarching aims of the paper are to: first, consider the growing sophistication of logistical practices, in light of the power logistics organisations have to manage the geographies of interconnection, be it commodities or populations. This is an area that has only recently been critically addressed, and, I suggest, one that requires further consideration.[9] Second, the paper attempts to delineate how such practices are continually undone by the very mechanisms developed to produce efficient interconnection. On this aspect the paper proposes that parallel practices are utilised by stowaways and smuggling gangs to infiltrate commodity networks: this I term extra-logistical knowledge. What is at stake with this point is that instability will always challenge the construction of supposedly stable relations. In this sense the paper speaks to a wider body of literature on the politics of disorder.[10] Finally, I address the further link involving the logistical practices of interconnection and those of the security techniques developed to protect the sites of interconnection. As such I suggest that this form of securitisation is symptomatic of the changing nature of territoriality, where the conception of territory as necessarily bounded shifts onto a further level: that of territoriality as both the facilitation and curtailment of movement. Given this I propose that logistics management practices embody a reconfigured notion of territoriality.

In order to address these aims I look to a range of sources. Initially my arguments concerning the practices of logistics management have been developed out of the key literature on logistics management techniques, in part because such sources provide an overview of the ideological bedrock of the discipline. Added to this the findings from two interviews with logistics specialists have been utilised, especially in terms of the context of container port operations.[11] Although one must be aware of the lack of neutrality of literature produced by organisations attempting to police undocumented immigration, for the section on forms of extra-logistical knowledge a range of official documents provided data on people smuggling, stowaways and specific techniques of infiltrating commodity networks. Added to this, a wide range of press reports have been consulted to provide an overview of various examples.[12] Given that my overarching focus lies with the systemic nature of the subject it was not felt that an ethnographic approach would prove necessary.[13] Finally, given the concern with forms of territoriality and security in the final section the further use of official policy documents – in the form of the previously mentioned ISPS Code – was considered appropriate.

LOGISTICAL NETWORKS AND INTERCONNECTIVITY

Cresswell's genre-defining work outlines the centrality of mobility to social and cultural experience: it is, he suggests, a "root metaphor for contemporary understandings of the world of culture and society".[14] Mobility could be said to challenge sedentarist notions of fixity and boundedness, promoting instead a form of contemporary life that is awash with fluidity, flows and becoming. At first this appears to be a significant ideological premise of mobility in its guise as a "nomadic metaphysics".[15] As is clear, however, the flows of 'stuff' that pervade certain simplistic assumptions of global mobilities have been contested. A *relational* understanding of mobility recognises the entanglement of mobility and immobility, movement and stasis.[16] Within studies of aeromobilities, for example, the role of surveillance techniques and full body scanning highlight such forms of control and containment of the mobile body.[17] This work deals directly with the intersection of movement and its securitisation, a link that feeds into debates on global flows of peoples, information, objects, etc., and more widely the question of globalisation per se.

The connection between geopolitics and mobility is significant, in that it foregrounds asymmetries of access to mobility. Privilege and disbarment are repeated across various categories of mobility, significantly in relation to migration.[18] There are those individuals for whom globalisation implies an un-tethering of spatial impediment, and those who are denied access to the networked configurations of global mobilities. A concept that continues to provide a useful sounding board for these debates is that of deterritorialisation; although the image of globalisation as a deterritorialised space of unfettered flows has, of course, been decisively critiqued by a range of geographers.[19] Popular perceptions of globalisation do still persist however, accentuating for example the dissolution of barriers to the free movement of trade.[20] These processes of deterritorialisation are claimed by advocates of economic globalisation to underscore the transformative potential of new spatio-temporal configurations, (such as digital communication networks and global transport), produced by the growing *interconnectivity* of socio-technological networks.[21] These processes of deterritorialisation are likewise claimed to lead to the disembedding and detachment of social relations away from specific, localised contexts towards the projection of social relations onto a global level.[22] Deterritorialisation may *at first* be defined in relation to such practices of de-linking from the confines of a territory. However, the unequal distribution of access to these processes (including mobility) brings with it the need to stress the very notion of deterritorialisation, by implication reterritorialisation, but perhaps most significantly that of territoriality. As Deleuze and Guattari make clear, the processes of decoding, destabilisation and destratification that are often emphasised as part of deterritorialisation are continually channelled through

recoding, restabilisation and restratification.[23] So, whilst the reach of the nation-state may indeed have been reconfigured, with sovereign power located both within and beyond the containment of the geographical border, there is, as Elden has recently suggested, a significant fault line in such assertions. In particular, the notion of deterritorialisation as a straightforward de-linking from the confines of territorial configuration neglects to recognise the reassertion of and – as I argue – reconfiguration of territoriality.[24] As a result the question of territory and spatial control becomes ever more fraught:

> Deterritorialization in its most useful sense therefore forces us to think anew on the notion of territory, and to recognize how its logic is both played out and challenged in a period of globalization.[25]

It is clear that the deterritorialising strategies of globalisation cannot be separated from reterritorialisation: they are mutually dependent.[26] I suggest that the decisive factor in this relationship is that of *interconnection*: on the one hand the control of interconnection for mobilising specific groups, information and trade, but simultaneously these interconnections are secured in terms of access to them. Put simply, deterritorialisation has to be produced and secured through reterritorialisation, thus necessitating a consideration of territoriality itself as a form of interconnectivity. The notion of interconnectivity (of the global networks of mobility) presents a significant problematic in relation to the governance and securitisation of such networks. The crux of the issue: increasing interconnectivity results in the growing complexity of connections. For advocates of global trade circulation the need to protect and securitise "good circulation from bad circulation" cannot be over-determined so that the flows are curtailed.[27] Reterritorialisation as an attempt to stabilise interconnection holds within it the potential to stymie connection. As a result the over-securitisation of flows in the form of immovable barriers to the movement of trade, for example, are simultaneously contested. Thus I suggest that territoriality must be figured around the *curtailment* of movement for unsanctioned flows and whilst also *facilitating* the movement of sanctioned flows. These entwined logics of interconnection are determined by a precarious balance between the apparent openness of mobility flows and the potential stasis of securitisation. This highlights the continued importance of territoriality, not solely as a notion of bounded territory but rather as *the production and securitisation of interconnectivity*. This makes the case for attending to the shifting configurations of territoriality.[28] What is at stake here, then, is the role of interconnection.

This abstract conception of interconnectivity is concretised through the operation of various mobility networks, however my emphasis lies with the spatio-temporal practices of commercial logistics. In particular I argue

that commercial logistics is an increasingly important exemplar of the strategic control of global mobilities, most clearly in terms of commodities, but by implication with corporeal movement. As Cowen rightly suggests, such practices of spatio-temporal calculation enforce "market logics on social and political problems".[29] The root of this market-driven control resides in my reading of geopower as the means to structure, manage and control the technologies and practices of interconnection in order to promote specific mobilities: those of sanctioned commodities, peoples, knowledge, etc. This conception of geopower refers to the relationship between governmentality and geography, supplementing this with the ability to control interconnection.[30] Here then the inherent relationship between geopower and logistics is crucial, for I argue that logistics represents the *strategic implementation of geopower.*

The role of commercial logistics has grown over the last decade, leading to a situation where it now accounts for "the management of the entire supply chain".[31] Such management practices are concerned with the facilitation and co-ordination of the movement of raw materials, manufactured commodities and resultant waste materials from production processes. The Council of Logistics Management defines logistics as

> part of Supply Chain Management that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverse flow and storage of goods, services, and related information between the point of origin and the point of consumption in order to meet customer requirements.[32]

Central to such operations is control over spatial and temporal dynamics in order to eradicate delays in the movement of raw materials and commodities alike, promoting a "path of least resistance" in terms of the shortest routes possible for moving goods.[33] Logistics is premised upon totalised systemic control, intended to ensure the integration of multifarious processes across "a single continually flowing system".[34] Founded on various spatial and temporal mandates, these include the facilitation, co-ordination and scheduling of movement; control over operational processes at a distance; forward planning to consider future changes in demand for particular products and services; treatment of the supply chain as a total system; eradication of wasted resources.[35] More critically, as a set of knowledges and practices it promotes a specific spatio-temporal ideology, that of global space-time as knowable, legible, and thus controllable.

The practical realisation of these forms of control comes in a variety of guises. For example, with the development of the shipping container the through-flow between differing spatial configurations such as land and sea were seen as negligible. Instead the standardised design of the container was claimed to eradicate wasted time spent on loading and unloading goods from ship to shore and then onto further forms of transport, such as rail

or freight delivery networks. Crucially the container sped up the entire process of commodity mobility through eradicating not only wasted time, but equally spatial and material difference. These modes of transference that the shipping container illustrates are located at seemingly insignificant, but strategically critical sites, including individual shipping containers, container ships, railway rolling stock, distribution centres, warehouses, port spaces, airports, etc. Further to this we see that more 'mundane' practices are also evident through the network: those of gantry crane movements between ship to portside, the vehicles moving containers around port spaces, as well as micro-technologies of interconnection, such as the design of shipping container lock-on mechanisms enabling the coupling of containers to various vehicles. In effect this reading of logistics as the implementation of geopower accentuates both the governmental notions of control at a variety of interconnecting scales including the regional, national and global levels,[36] but just as critically the more mundane sites and practices: an aspect that is telling in terms of my later argument concerning extra-logistical knowledge.

Overall, it is at the wider infrastructural level that logistics management as an instrument of geopower becomes most evident. Infrastructure is central to the processes of interconnection through the interaction of "complex material circuits" which account for the circulation of information, communications, waste, energy, commodities, peoples, etc.[37] For interaction to occur the global mobility infrastructure is figured around a tightly coupled apparatus of knowledge, practices and devices. The potential levels of complexity and multiplicity which occur at these moments of interaction necessitates the *stabilisation* of relations.[38] Stability is a key feature of logistical power, where "producing geopower involves the construction and distribution of objects at a distance, objects which must stay stable if they are to be projected".[39] Just as the processes of deterritorialisation would appear to rely upon producing and controlling the mechanisms which accelerate the detachment of social relations from embedded locales, so these processes of detachment and attachment have to be stabilised to seamlessly interconnect. In order for this to occur stabilising mechanisms have been developed, including the standardisation of movement. Whilst the histories of train and air travel represent the most visible standardised forms of mobility infrastructures,[40] commodity distribution networks similarly rely on the standardisation of interconnection between the various elements of the network, as described previously. In the context of maritime logistics and beyond, the shipping container is a significant part of a wider network of global interconnections powered through standardised material devices and procedures.[41] Broeze, writing of the development of containerisation, argues:

> Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of containerization was that it broke through the fetters of shipping's isolation in the transport chain

and created physical and organisational multi-modal cooperation, and, later, integration where none had existed before.[42]

Tellingly, the critical aspect of this statement involves the integration of previously disparate elements. The sheer quantity of containers (and the resultant potential for disorderliness) highlights the importance of standardisation, both of the containers themselves but also of the logistical infrastructure behind their movements. There are specific geographies of interconnection: those strategic sites of exchange within the global flows where the movement between different aspects of the commodity network occurs. Such geographies of interconnection manifest themselves at globally significant sites, including container ports such as Shanghai International Port or Port of Rotterdam and combined logistics hubs like Dubai Logistics City, as well as seemingly insignificant locations, including regional distribution warehouses, railway terminals, lorry parks, or motorway service stations.[43] The strategic importance of these locations are emphasised by Graham and Marvin's work on the interconnection between geographically disconnected sites. In such a scenario the connection at these points of exchange occurs via "tunnel effects":[44] these are transfers between differing elements of the mobility network such as the movement of containers from truck bed to the container stacks in a port space.[45] Critically these tunnel effects are situated at those spaces of interconnection where the 'adjustment' between differing elements of the network occurs. That these types of spaces hold such strategic importance to global trade flows is testament to the importance of interconnection between the various elements in the network. Likewise the mobile entities that punctuate these spaces, such as lorries, packing crates and shipping containers become critical links in the supply chain. The vital importance of such strategic sites evinces the complexity of interconnection within commodity logistics networks.

Crucially, my reading of logistics is premised on its impact on spatio-temporal organisation, facilitation and implementation in the name of market-driven control of the mobility of people and things. Given this, there is a clear emphasis on the strategic geopower that logistics wields in terms of the ability to mobilise capital in its multifarious guises. Perhaps more fundamentally, in political terms the historical roots of commercial logistics lie with military strategy.[46] To be sure, the ability to mobilise and co-ordinate information, peoples, commodities, as well as armies and munitions is the origin of political power, i.e., the strategic projection of power across geographical territory comes from the organisation of time and space as legible, manageable and calculable.[47] To this end, if we move beyond the Council of Logistics Management's description of logistics and instead utilise De Landa's definition of logistics as a "distributed system of control",[48] then we further posit the spatial nature of this. As a *distributed* entity logistical knowledge has the means to promote interconnection through stabilising the apparatus

of interconnection across multiple sites and practices. As thus far outlined, logistical knowledges and practices are premised on a range of standardised devices like the shipping container and its lock-on mechanism through to larger scale infrastructural 'devices' such as container ports and ferry terminals. But there are also the seemingly mundane and insignificant nodes in the network such as freight lorries, service stations, etc. Given the need to stabilise movement, these points of exchange are critical for the efficacious operation of the networks. Above all the question of *interconnection* is central to the strategic implementation of geopower. More pointedly the means to control and make legible spatial complexity is a decisive factor in this debate, for it highlights the ways in which territoriality is configured through the means to enforce certain *types* of interconnection, and thus specific forms of mobility.

'APPROPRIATION' AS EXTRA-LOGISTICAL KNOWLEDGE

There is, however, an inherent problematic at the nucleus of this debate. The immanent union between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation illustrates the conflation of different types of interconnection, both orderly and disorderly. In this section I suggest that the production of efficient interconnectivity is the self-same moment of its undoing. That is, the repetitive, ubiquitous, and standardised qualities of interconnection such as those seen at ferry terminals, established transport routes or the vehicles which make up the networks, are possible sites of fallibility or *de*-stabilisation. Here I consider how the interconnectedness of these points of exchange opens them up to infiltration by non-sanctioned groups, be that the terrorist activity identified by schemes such as the Container Security Initiative or smuggling syndicates.[49] I argue that interconnection does not solely produce geopower through logistical knowledges, but is part of the undoing of geopower. In attempting to exclude the movement of undocumented immigrants from established corporeal travel networks, the parallel networks of commodity mobilities offer one means of circumventing the security procedures of corporeal networks. This directly relates to my earlier argument concerning the asymmetries of *access* to interconnection: the undocumented immigrant, in search of political safety or economic surety (albeit precarious), has to embark upon a journey that is fraught with extreme danger and often outside of the normal expectations of corporeal mobility altogether. With the latter, people smuggling syndicates have been seen to utilise existing commodity mobility networks to smuggle individuals for large sums of money.[50] Interconnection thus manifests itself across a variety of registers outside of those envisioned: the illicit appropriation of already extant commodity mobility networks; and also through the interconnection of differing forms of mobility, namely commodity and corporeal.

The relationship between mobility and migration is clearly a complex one. In the context of undocumented immigration the desire for some form of economic stability is a direct result of the 'lure' of advanced capitalism. Part of the problem lies with the disparity between the desperate mobilities of undocumented migrants and the image produced under advanced capitalism of supposedly unfettered flows of information, peoples and commodities. For Kumin, "as countries around the world continue to tighten access to their territories and their asylum policies, refugees may increasingly be forced to resort to traffickers, smugglers and other illegal means to reach safety".[51] In the context of illegitimated migration the increase in securitisation of borders leads to the use of alternative means of entry, including the previously outlined strategic points of exchange and interconnection. It is with this context in mind that I turn to the issue of 'extra-logistical knowledge'. This term is intended to highlight the parallel forms of tactical knowledge and expertise that are developed (as a result of being excluded from legitimated corporeal flows) in order to *appropriate* and utilise the interconnectivity of commodity flows. In effect the knowledge and practices that human smuggling gangs or stowaways employ may be said to represent an illicit form of geopower: rather than geopower as the management and control of interconnection, this alternative form utilises the self-same stability of interconnection for unsanctioned mobility.[52] Such tactical appropriation is derived from knowledge of the repetitive formations of logistical practices, the regularity of key transit routes, and above all the recognition of the strategic importance of the sites of interconnection in the form of lorry parks, ferry terminals, container ports, and also airports. This perhaps suggests the paradoxical aspects of attempting to make space legible and knowable: by trying to stabilise interconnectivity the resultant efficiencies are one of the mechanisms used to illicitly smuggle the undocumented. To follow Kumin, the need for such knowledge emanates from the increasing securitisation associated with immigration policies. In conceptual terms it also derives from the wider processes of deterritorialisation. As Paul Patton notes, deterritorialisation produces "mutant flows generated by the dynamic of the system as a whole".[53] Although Patton's argument is distanced from the specificity of migratory flows (especially the loaded nature of terminology such as 'mutant') I suggest that it outlines the way in which the logic of interconnectivity is threaded through with the immanent presence of non-legitimated flows as derivatives of interconnectivity.

Scarpellino describes a situation where "each year, thousands of men and women cross the border between the United States and Mexico, "running". Certainly, not all are on foot; they may cross in a van, or a railroad car, or under the false floor of a produce truck".[54] As we can see from this example of the US-Mexico border undocumented immigrants resort to various tactics to illicitly cross borders or infiltrate complex transport networks.

With the latter mode of concealing oneself in an improvised space, there is an important illustration of the measures that are carried out in order to circumvent the securitising gaze of border officials. However, such acts of concealment on established transport networks are by no means a new phenomenon. In terms of the transport networks of early modernity Cresswell argues that by the 1870s American hobos were one of the first illicit users of standardised networks.[55] In particular the design of the freight wagons and the routinised scheduling facilitated what Cresswell terms a "working knowledge of the hidden spaces of a train regardless of the line in question".[56] Key to this is the regularity of wagon design, repetitive nature of the network and routinised scheduling. But, as these early stowaways knew, the spaces of mobility were policed and so had to resort to tactics that rendered them undetectable. For the hobo the rail networks may have offered speed, however they were also notoriously dangerous, especially as invisibility from surveillance was typically located at the margins of safety underneath the freight wagons: a practice known as "riding the rods".[57]

The largely inter-regional networks of early transportation networks differ in relation to the present-day globalisation of interconnection, as well as the quantity of the points of exchange. With contemporary transport networks there have been numerous reports of stowaways onboard intercontinental aircraft, with the most precarious mode being the use of aircraft wheel wells. In 1993 for example the *New York Times* reported the story of a 13-year-old Columbian child who was found alive after tumbling out of the wheel well of a cargo plane at Miami airport.[58] The report speaks of the child being covered in frost after the 1,000-mile journey, with only the fact that the wheel well was pressurised enabling his survival. Although in this case it is difficult to determine the prior knowledge of the aircraft's destination such acts of desperate mobility are in part suggestive of the symbolism of air travel as a route to freedom. Whilst road and sea routes may not perceivably have the same danger as stowing away in aircraft wheel wells the principles of circumvention are similar. Undocumented migrants are smuggled through already established networks of tourist and commodity mobility, including shipping containers, inside freight lorries and on their undersides. As with the historical example of the hobo there is a form of 'extra-logistical knowledge' in operation. Such practices of appropriation and circumvention are premised on awareness of both the potential modes of transit, be they aircraft, lorry, cargo vessel or shipping container, specific points of exit and entry such as ferry terminals, as well as the transit routes. Given the standardised design of the shipping container this is particularly prone to forms of tampering, with a common tactic being the removal of rivets which hold the door seal in place, allowing the door to be opened without evidence of tampering.[59] However, as Kumin discusses, the use of containers is fraught with danger, noting the discovery of twenty-five Chinese men in a shipping

container at the port of Vancouver: although the men were found alive in this case, travelling in such conditions can often lead to death due either to suffocation, dehydration or starvation.[60]

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has published regular reports on stowaway incidents on board cargo vessels, noting criteria such as the locations where stowaways embarked and disembarked, as well as the methods used. These include an account from 2008 of four stowaways found in a container onboard the *Seaboard Trader* bound for Haiti. The men (of unknown nationality) were discovered after crew heard noises on the main deck.[61] The ship itself is a very common method of concealment, including the use of specific spaces of concealment on board. This includes the use of the ship's rudder trunking, an area where the shaft of the rudder connects with the body of the ship. Such an area, which is used by both stowaways and for drug smuggling, provides 'sufficient' room (some one-and-a-half metres wide by two-and-a-half metres tall) for concealment. It is noted that these areas – deemed a "smugglers' cave" – are accessed whilst ships are at anchor in port.[62] The need for concealment is of continual importance for practices of desperate mobility. Invisibility from surveillance leads to the infiltration of such spaces of mobility outside of the accepted conditions for corporeal movement. Like the hobos some 130 years before them today's undocumented immigrants attempting to cross the English Channel from northern France often resort to concealing themselves under lorries,[63] or as Chrisafis observes, even "taking more desperate measures, such as hiding in tankers designed to carry toxic chemicals".[64]

The IMO data also provides a potential overview of the routes used by individual undocumented migrants and smuggling networks alike. These suggest common points of entry to Europe like Greece, Italy or Malta.[65] It has been acknowledged that countries with close proximity to mainland Europe are favoured, with the Canary Islands a useful example.[66] Recent reports have noted the continued use of the Canary Islands as a popular entrance point into Europe, given that undocumented immigrants using the islands are often moved to mainland Spain. The journey between the northwest African coast and the Canaries, taken in small wooden vessels, is not part of the global commodity network but significantly the geographical proximity of the Canary Islands to Africa is a form of 'extra-logistical knowledge' in its own right, i.e., an awareness of the shortest route. Established transport routes are important mechanisms for undocumented mobilities. Often less highly secured than the strategic sites of interconnection, examples include the case a 15-year-old Afghan boy who journeyed for over one year to reach the UK, travelling through Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy by lorry, then finally through France by train. The last part of his journey – crossing the English Channel – proved equally as troublesome as the rest, with five attempts in one week to stowaway on the underside of lorries, only to be apprehended by security patrols.[67]

My concern with the development of tactical, appropriative knowledge, is intended to emphasise the fact that the standardised, interconnected logic of contemporary time-space leads ultimately to its undoing. The knowledge of these standardised, ubiquitous forms is a symptom of standardisation itself. The efficiencies associated with logistical practices of integration, scheduling and facilitation of movement are a result of interconnectivity, but crucially the tactics of extra-logistical knowledge exemplify how interconnectivity is inherently unstable. By broaching the security of the various mobility networks these acts of desperate mobility demonstrate how the web of ordering is continually undone at multiple sites. Whilst the mostly Afghan men trying to cross from Calais to the English coast do occasionally reach their intended destination many others are either apprehended on their arrival at UK ports or discovered onboard lorries in France. In 2008 according to the UK Border Agency some 28,000 attempts to cross the Channel were intercepted.[68] Such figures attest to the high levels of security posted at these strategic points of exchange, an issue I now consider in terms of territoriality.

THE SECURITISATION APPARATUS

The political theorist William E. Connolly has recently spoken of the continuous interplay between forces of destabilisation (such as forms of extra-logistical appropriation described above) and patterns of stabilisation.[69] These oscillations are emblematic of the immanent presence of order and disorder in all systems. As suggested in the previous section logistical geopower may be appropriated for illicit purposes: it is disorderly in terms of sanctioned mobilities. There is, as Connolly suggests, an ongoing exchange between destabilisation and stabilisation. And in this case we see that stabilisation occurs through the use of security mechanisms to protect the system of interconnectivity. Central to the dynamics of global commodity mobilities is the management of interconnection through logistical knowledge, but equally such knowledge is predicated on increasing strategies of securitisation. I argue in this section that further forms of stabilisation are produced through the territoriality of securing interconnection. Alongside the rhetoric of ease (and inevitability) that pervades the ideology of logistics lie sophisticated and exclusionary measures. Although the tactical appropriation of extra-logistical knowledge suggests that these measures are far from fail-safe they do illustrate the complex processes of securitisation that pervade mobility networks. Part of logistical geopower, securitisation is a complex apparatus of practices and procedures which complement the very mechanisms of interconnection. Equally, the limitations on movement that security practices impinge have the potential to disrupt the free flow of commodities.[70] The inherent complexity of this relationship is marked out by Foucault in his discussion of security apparatuses. For him the question

of territoriality and security is not solely constituted by the permanency of territorial boundaries, but also by "making possible, guaranteeing and ensuring circulations: the circulation of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera".[71] As such we see that interconnectivity cannot be wrested from the territoriality of control.

Logistics resides at the very heart of this combinatory logic of interconnection and control, for the types of knowledge synonymous with the propulsion of commodities on a global scale also account for various regimes of security at the geopolitical level. Indeed, this is precisely where Julian Reid's conception of "logistical life" is representative of the increasing power of logistics beyond both the commercial and military realms through its seepage into the biopolitical control of populations.[72] The wider security apparatus within which logistical life operates acts according to a multiplicity of practices and controls on the movement of commodities, information, viruses, populations, etc. Given my previous arguments on extra-logistical knowledge a further regime of governance operates at the *intersection* between differing forms of mobility. The free flow of commodities must be protected whilst the movement of illegitimated peoples and things has to be curtailed. In part, this can be seen through the logic of *separation*. Although this may appear contradictory at first given the logistics of interconnection and interaction, there is a pervasive ideology of inside and outside.

Contemporary modes of territoriality operate through the creation of evermore sophisticated conceptions of the border. The border is far from static: it permits certain people through it, whilst simultaneously limiting entry according to categorisation.[73] This dual function of the border suggests that the political rhetoric of an unbounded flow of knowledge and objects comes with a concomitant reassertion of the nation-state's power to limit corporeal movement. Instead of the notion of the container-border there are now "complex and varied patterns of both implicit and explicit bordering and ordering practices"[74] that seek to control and order all forms of movement. In its heterogeneous formation the security apparatus is constituted by various formations: where material boundaries might typically take the form of wall, fence, gate, or seal as practiced forms of governance, control can also be extended into the textual arena in the form of legal-political discourse. In this case I refer to my focus on the International Ship & Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) as a mode of textual security. This idea of textual security refers to the notion of security at a distance, whereby the concrete manifestations of security are firstly produced through official statutes that determine the form material entities may take.

The ISPS Code came into force in 2004 following a 2002 conference held at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London. The intention of the 'Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974' was to update the existing Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

The amendments to SOLAS include the adoption of the ISPS Code. Given the purported threat of terrorist activity the remit of the Code at first appears to be the reduction of threat to shipping from such activities, however it is clear that of central import is the potential impact on global trade flows. The main objective of the Code is:

> To establish an international framework involving co-operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade.[75]

The implementation of the framework is said to depend upon a *standardised* and consistent approach which evaluates potential risks.[76] Tellingly, the consistency and standardisation of approach echoes the networked geographies of global trade, and thus the potential threats. This networked configuration means the Code itself is part of a wider apparatus of territoriality, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI). In line with ISPS Code the CSI also seeks to identify "optimal trade lanes and ports" which may be prone to infiltration.[77] Central to the CSI is the process of pre-screening containers before they enter US border space, projecting the border beyond the territorial confines of the physical boundary, a method that Cowen describes as "extraterritorial".[78]

Structured according to mandatory and non-mandatory procedures for reducing security threats the ISPS Code stipulates a variety of measures which ships and port facilities must adhere to, such as "identification of weaknesses, including human factors, in the infrastructure, policies and procedures" as part of the ship security plan, through to the prevention of unauthorised entrance to port facilities.[79] Ships and port facilities alike must hold to a three-level security plan set by Contracting Governments, however, according to the Code the security must always be set at level 1, indicating the assumption of a permanent state of security. Acknowledging the appropriation of logistical strategies of interconnection seen in the previous section, the Code also stipulates the importance of awareness of such illicit knowledge: security organisations "should be able to demonstrate their knowledge of techniques used to circumvent security measures".[80]

Following Cowen's notion of CSI's extraterritorial projection beyond the container border of the United States it is clear that the logic of internal and external security provision becomes problematised. This is furthered by the networked geographies of global trade itself, for a strict separation between inside and outside would negate the interconnectedness of logistical knowledge. However, whilst Cowen's argument concerning the role of "seam space" highlights the complexity of contemporary border practices, the ISPS Code still outlines the divisions between internal and external features

of the logistical infrastructure.[81] So, where the material defences of security gates, container seals, or surveillance systems offer protection through partitioning space this is preceded by the identification of such devices in the ISPS Code. In a prescient example the Code clearly articulates such a model of interior/exterior. In the section on port security the distinction is raised between port facilities and those spaces adjacent to them, an area that is highlighted as a potential source of infiltration.[82] According to the code these "structures adjacent to the port facility . . . could cause damage within the facility or be used for the purpose of causing damage to the facility or for illicit observation of the facility".[83] This illustrates the strategic differentiation between the port facility as legitimated and the adjacent space as illegitimate, notably through mention being made of the observation of the facility from outside. The protection from and identification of risk and vulnerability is a recurrent theme in the ISPS Code, with suggested measures including surveillance equipment as well as permanent barriers.

Amid the detailed language there are distinct phrases that attest to the relationship between interconnectivity and potential infringements that may curtail it. As part of the wider set of logistical knowledge a key theme is that of continuity, in particular the continuous, ongoing function of the system. It is stated how important it is to protect infrastructure, in particular those infrastructural devices that produce interconnection, be they "accesses, entrances, approaches, and anchorages, manoeuvring and berthing areas",[84] as well as "bridges, railways [and] roads".[85] Movement is sacrosanct in the port space and its ongoing operation is dependent upon allowing those sanctioned as internal to the system to operate without hindrance: it talks of allowing "individuals to remain within the port facility without challenge".[86] However, entry is only possible once the individual has been given appropriate clearance, deemed acceptable that is to the operation of the system. By contrast movement is blocked for those actors not reasoned appropriate – the Code states that a port security plan should provide the "means of impeding movement through the remaining access points, e.g. security barriers".[87] Here then is the crux: those actors identified as critical to the distributive system are promised unimpeded movement; those not are blocked, limited by architectural and non-architectural impediments. Amidst the minutiae of endless protocols perhaps the most illuminating phrase that one can take from this document is the need to "enhance control",[88] a blatant statement of the ideological foundations of this global system of interconnection.

CONCLUSION

As I have attempted to show in the previous section, the security that the ISPS Code produces is concerned with the construction of material and immaterial 'divides' (physical defences as well as procedures) that protect the networks

of global trade from potential infiltration by terrorist activity or, more specifi-
cally for the current argument, from the appropriation of interconnectedness
by people smuggling networks and undocumented immigrants. Part of the
wider security apparatus, these managerial strategies attempt to exclude that
which is deemed detrimental to the system. Given this it is clearly evident
that security provision is a constituent element of the logistical organisa-
tion of the global flows of legitimated commodities and people. That these
exclusionary divides are intrinsic features of geopolitical power illustrates the
immanent relationship between interconnection and securitisation. The con-
trol and protection of legitimated movement, be it commodities or bodies,
rely on operational stability and infrastructural certainty that can function at
various nodes in the network. Likewise distancing is a recurring trope in the
ISPS Code suggesting the importance within security provision of keeping
potentially foreboding factors outside of the network. In this case it is evi-
dent that securitisation also entails the governance of legitimacy. However,
this also outlines the complexity of the situation: for the perpetuation of
binary opposites as part of the securitisation apparatus sits alongside the
relational, networked geographies of interconnection.

The strategic importance of the points of exchange in various mobility
networks was considered at the systemic level; the entrance points to ports
or airports; the underside of lorries; concealment in shipping containers; or
the wheel wells of aircraft. For the study of the geopolitics of global trade
it is imperative that the strategic importance of the management of flows at
these sites continue to be acknowledged. The various examples from media
reports of infiltration were employed in order to demonstrate the intrin-
sic relationship between territoriality, mobility and infrastructural geopower.
It was argued that the processes of standardisation upon which various forms
of mobility are dependent may constitute their immanent shortcomings: the
repetitive, regularised qualities of shipping container design or the routes
employed by shipping lines make them vulnerable to alternative uses.

A key facet in this debate has been the intertwined logics of
interconnection and securitisation, but also the interaction between differ-
ing mobilities, legitimated and illegitimated. The fundamental problematic of
advanced capitalist mobilities is the assumption that certain forms of move-
ment are sacrosanct whilst others are malevolent. By no means downplaying
the suffering inflicted upon the individuals affected by human trafficking
Bhattacharyya's work in particular underlines the skewed ideological premise
of claims surrounding the illegality of undocumented migration. She empha-
sises how the impulse toward unfettered trade flows masks the concomitant
reassertion of sovereign boundaries:

> A central inconsistency in the celebration of economic liberalisation has
> been the attitude to migration. While all other forms of free movement
> have been championed, the free movement of people is hampered at

every turn, often by those most vocal about the importance of dismantling barriers to trade.[89]

Factors surrounding economic liberalisation are themselves one of the reasons for the flow of undocumented immigrants seeking employment. As such the limitations on the free movement of people produce the parallel mobilities of undocumented peoples through a heightened desire to reach their destination. By highlighting the practices of extra-logistical appropriation I have suggested that the rhetorical assumptions surrounding undocumented immigration are premised on a logic of sanctioned mobilities, which is torn open by the practices of desperate mobility.

On a wider level the growing sophistication of logistical knowledge demands further engagement with the strategic geopolitical power to manage and limit the geographies of circulation and interconnection, be it commodities or populations. For although such knowledge has been central to the production and distribution of military capabilities, the reach of commercial logistics is continuing to increase as Bonacich and Wilson acknowledge. Indeed we are seeing the development of management strategies such as the 'Total Logistics Concept': an attempt to effect control over the entire logistics chain through "planning horizons".[90] Situated within the pre-planning regimes of such approaches is the importance of pre-emptive planning.[91] In pre-empting possible impediments to the efficiency of the supply chain network it is clear how the securitisation of interconnection is never a posthumous reaction but rather immanent to the very interconnectedness of the network. From this we can finally return to the question of territoriality: as stated at the outset, the literature on deterritorialisation has already effectively articulated the continued centrality of reterritorialisation to processes of deterritorialisation; however as Ó Tuathail has acknowledged it is the "changing status, power and meaning [of both terms] in relationship to postmodern technological constellations, speed machines and global webs of capitalism" that necessitates continued analysis.[92] Such constellations, machines and webs continue to develop apace, as we see with the strategic geopower of logistical knowledge to manage flows at the geopolitical level, but as Reid's work suggests, increasingly at the biopolitical.

NOTES

1. M. Levinson, *The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006) p. 277.

2. Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs, Container Security Division, *Container Security Initiative: 2006–2011 Strategic Plan* (Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2006) no page.

3. International Maritime Organization, *International Ship & Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendments 2002* (London: IMO 2003); see also D. Cowen, 'A Geography of Logistics: Market Authority

and the Security of Supply Chains', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 100/3 (2010) on the relationship between ISPS and port security.

4. The term 'undocumented' is used throughout the text as it is felt that 'irregular' pertains to a labelling of certain forms of migration as 'abnormal'.

5. See for example T. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the 21st Century* (London: Allen Lane 2005)

6. A. Geddes, 'Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold: The Politics of Irregular Migration, Human Trafficking and People Smuggling in the UK', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 7/3 (2005) p. 325.

7. See G. Bhattacharyya, *Traffick: The Illicit Movement of People and Things* (London: Pluto Press 2005) pp. 31–60.

8. R. Väyrynen, *Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime: (Discussion Paper No. 2003/72)* (Helsinki: United Nations University 2003) p. 3.

9. See Cowen, 'A Geography of Logistics' (note 3). Other exceptions include B. Ashton, 'The Factory Without Walls', *Mute: Culture and Politics After the Net* 2/4 (2007) pp. 58–67; B. H. Bratton, 'Introduction: Logistics of Habitable Circulation', in P. Virilio, *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e) 2006) pp. 7–25; D. Cowen, 'Struggling with 'Security': National Security and Labour in the Ports', *Just Labour* 10 (Spring 2007) pp. 30–44; D. Cowen, '*Containing* Insecurity: Logistics Space, U.S. Port Cities, and the "War on Terror"', in S. Graham (ed.), *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails* (Abingdon: Routledge 2010) pp. 69–83; D. Cowen and N. Smith, 'After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics', *Antipode* 41/1 (2009) pp. 22–48; K. Easterling, *Enduring Innocence: Global Architecture and its Political Masquerades* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005); N. Thrift, 'Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of Thinking Resulting from the Development of New Kinds of Spatial Awareness', *Economy and Society* 33/4 (2004) p. 589; P. Virilio, *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e) 2006).

10. See for example W. E. Connolly, 'Materiality, Experience and Surveillance', in B. Braun and S. J. Whatmore (eds.), *Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy and Public Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2010) pp. 63–86; see also K.N, Hayles, *Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990); M. Michael, *Reconnecting Culture, Technology and Nature: From Society to Heterogeniety* (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 18–45; R. Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press 2008); M. Serres, *Genesis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1995); M. Serres, *The Parasite* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2007).

11. Personal interview with Logistics Manager [anonymous] at London Thamesport, 29 March 2007; Personal interview with General Manager for Logistics Operations [anonymous] at Port of Felixstowe, UK, 3 May 2007.

12. My use of such sources is intended to reflect Bruno Latour's observations concerning the value of multiple forms of explanation, be they press reports, cartoons, or novels. See B. Latour, 'The Politics of Explanation: An Alternative', in S. Woolgar (ed.), *Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Sage 1988) pp. 155–176.

13. For a valuable ethnographic account of the routes utilised by smuggling networks to bring undocumented migrants to northern Europe see H. Courau, ''Tomorrow Inch Allah, Chance!' People Smuggler Networks in Sangatte', *Immigrants and Minorities* 22/2/3 (2003) pp. 374–387.

14. T. Cresswell, *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern World* (London: Routledge 2006) p. 25.

15. Ibid., p. 42. Cresswell rightly critiques the over-abundance of the nomadic metaphor and insists that such a figure of ceaseless movement is robbed of the specific groundings of place and kinship.

16. P. Adey, 'If Mobility is Everything Then it is Nothing: Towards a Relational Politics of (Im)mobilities', *Mobilities* 1/1 (2006) p. 86; see also D. Bissell, 'Animating Suspension: Waiting for Mobilities', *Mobilities* 2/2 (2007) pp. 277–298.

17. See P. Adey, 'Surveillance at the Airport: Surveilling Mobility/Mobilizing Surveillance', *Environment and Planning A,* 36/8 (2004) pp. 1365–1380; P. Adey, *Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2010); B. J. Muller, 'Travelers, Borders, Dangers: Locating the Political at the Biometric Border', in M. Salter (ed.), *Politics at the Airport* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2008) pp. 127–144.

18. See D. Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage) p. 86.

19. N. Brenner, 'Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', *Urban Studies* 36/3 (1999) pp. 431–451; S. Elden, 'Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World', *Trans Inst Br Geogr NS* 30 (2005) pp. 8–19; P. F. Kelly, 'The Geographies and Politics of Globalization', *Progress in Human Geography* 23/3 (1999) pp. 379–400;

G. Ó Tuathail, 'Political Geography III: Dealing with Deterritorialization', *Progress in Human Geography* 22/1 (1998) pp. 81–93.

    20. Kelly (note 19) p. 382.

    21. Coming from a Deleuzian perspective Ian Buchanan makes the case that deterritorialisation refers to a "radical transformation of subjectivity". Such a position, whilst at odds to the image of deterritorialisation as unfettered capital flow, still implies a generalised condition, rather than one based on access to such transformations. See I. Buchanan, 'Space in the Age of Non-Place' in I. Buchanan and G. Lambert (eds.), *Deleuze and Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2005) p. 22.

    22. A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity 1990) p. 21.

    23. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Athlone 1988) p. 55.

    24. Elden, 'Missing the Point' (note 19) p. 9.

    25. Ibid., p. 10.

    26. Ó Tuathail, 'Political Geography III' (note 19) p. 82.

    27. M. Dillon, 'Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and Contingency', in *The Globalization of Security: ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/02* (London: Chatham House 2005) p. 3.

    28. On the changing notion of territory see S. Elden, *Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2009) p. xx.

    29. Cowen, 'A Geography of Logistics' (note 3) p. 602.

    30. G. Ó Tuathail, 'At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century's End', *Alternatives* 22/1 (1997) p. 39. My approach also follows that of Michael Mann; see M. Mann, *The Source of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rises of Classes and Nation States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993).

    31. E. Bonacich, and J. B. Wilson, *Getting the Goods: Ports, Labour, and the Logistics Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2008) p. 3.

    32. J. T. Mentzer, S. Min, L. M. Bobbitt, 'Toward a Unified Theory of Logistics', *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management* 34/7 & 8 (2004) pp. 606–627, available at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=725698131&Fmt=3&clientId=52553&RQT=309&VName=PQD>, accessed 3 Jan. 2008.

    33. Personal interview with General Manager (note 11). During this interview a constant motif was that of speeding up the movement of shipping containers both in the port space and beyond.

    34. A. Rushton, P. Croucher, and P. Baker, *The Handbook of Logistics and Distribution Management*, 3rd ed. (London: Kogan Page 2006) p. 4.

    35. Ibid.

    36. At the regional level there are examples of the expansion of existing logistics enclaves such as port facilities to incorporate larger scale on-site distribution warehouses so as to alleviate the need to move commodities from ports to distribution centres located some distance away. These so-called 'portcentric' solutions demonstrate the increasing strategic importance of such sites. See Analytiqa, *Portcentric Logistics: The Supply Chain of the Future* (Welwyn Garden City: Analytiqa 2007).

    37. S. Graham, 'When Infrastructures Fail', in S. Graham (ed.), *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails* (Abingdon: Routledge 2010) p. 2; see also S. Harris Ali and R. Keil, 'Securitizing Networked Flows: Infectious Diseases and Airports', in S. Graham (ed.), *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails* (Abingdon: Routledge 2010) p. 97.

    38. Dillon (note 27).

    39. N. Thrift, 'It's the Little Things', in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) p. 381.

    40. See, for example, W. Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Leamington: Berg 1986).

    41. Levinson (note 1) p. 142.

    42. F. Broeze, *The Globalization of the Oceans: Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present* (St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association 2002) p. 10.

    43. On the architectural significance of distribution centres (or 'big sheds') see M. Pawley, *Terminal Architecture* (London: Reaktion 1998). On Dubai Logistics City see Cowen, 'Containing Insecurity' (note 9).

    44. S. Graham and S. Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism* (London: Routledge 2001) p. 358.

    45. Personal interview with Logistics Manager (note 11).

46. See G. C. Thorpe, *Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press 1986 [orig. 1917]); see also M. De Landa, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (New York: Zone Books 1991); C. Martin, 'Controlling Flow: On the Logistics of Distributive Space', in A. Ballantyne and C. L. Smith (eds.), *Architecture in the Space of Flows* (Abingdon: Routledge 2012); M. Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978).

47. See Mann (note 30). Mann highlights the characteristic differences between military/political power and economic power. Notably for him military and political forms of power are determined through authoritative power in the guise of a centralised command structure 'projecting' power to a group of 'subordinates' as he terms them. By contrast diffused forms of power associated with economic might operates more spontaneously and in a less centralised manner.

48. De Landa (note 46) p. 123.

49. At ports such as London Thamesport in the UK tobacco smuggling is a significant problem, with some 52 million cigarettes smuggled in 2006/2007 (see Personal interview with Logistics Manager note 11).

50. Kelso describes one group of Kurds paying £5000 each to be smuggled to the United Kingdom. See P. Kelso, 'Voyage of the Damned', *The Guardian G2*, 20 Dec. 2001, p. 6.

51. J. Kumin, 'A Multi-Million Dollar Trade in Humans', *Refugees* 2/119 (2000) p. 19.

52. It should, of course, be noted again that the tactical knowledge that I speak of here is often only available to undocumented migrants through the payment of large sums of money to people smuggling gangs (see note 50).

53. P. Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge 2000) p. 98.

54. M. Scarpellino, '"Corriendo": Hard Boundaries, Human Rights and the Undocumented Immigrant', *Geopolitics* 12 (2007) p. 330.

55. T. Cresswell, *The Tramp in America* (London: Reaktion 2001) p. 30.

56. Ibid., p. 31.

57. Ibid.

58. 'Young Stowaway Gets Temporary U.S. Home', *New York Times*, 6 June 1993, p. 33.

59. M. Hawkins, 'Container Tampering', available at <http://www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/signum-services/>, accessed 27 Jan. 2009.

60. UNHCR, 'The State of the World's Refugees 1993', available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3eeeddba4&query=container%20ships>, accessed 4 Jan. 2008. Kelso also describes the death from suffocation of nine Kurdish men smuggled in a container (note 50).

61. See International Maritime Organization, *Reports on Stowaway Incidents (October to December 2008)* (London: IMO 2009) p. 17.

62. No Author, 'Rudder Trunking Used for Smuggling', *Casualty Information* 4(10) (May 2010) p. 2; see also 'Rudder Trunk Security', *Stoploss Bulletin* 38 (May 2005) p. 3.

63. M. Lescure, 'UNHCR Returns to Calais to Provide Migrants, Refugees with Information', available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4a3914c86.html>, accessed 25 June 2009.

64. A. Chrisafis, 'Trapped in 'Le Jungle' – But Still Dreaming of El Dorado', *The Guardian*, 4 July 2009, p. 12.

65. V. Buschschluter, 'Satellite Helps Fight Illegal Immigration', available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7818478.stm>, accessed 7 Feb. 2009.

66. 'Spain Vows to Curb Migrant Wave', *BBC News*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5313560.stm#map>, accessed 10 Jan. 2007.

67. Chrisafis (note 64) p. 12.

68. Ibid., p. 13.

69. Connolly (note 10) p. 64.

70. See Cowen and Smith (note 9) pp. 32–33.

71. M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–78* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2009) p. 29.

72. J. Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of Logistical Societies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006) p. 33.

73. J. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000).

74. H. van Houtum, O. Kramsch, and W. Zierhofer, 'Prologue: B/ordering Space', in H. van Houtum, O. Kramsch, and W. Zierhofer (eds.), *B/ordering Space* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005) p. 2.

75. International Maritime Organization, *International Ship & Port* (note 3) p. 6.

76. <http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897#what>, accessed 13 July 2009.

77. Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs (note 2) p. 5.

78. Cowen, 'Geography of Logistics' (note 3) p. 605.

79. IMO (note 3) p. 13. During fieldwork at London Thamesport in the United Kingdom (the only fully automated port in the UK) it was noted how central such security measures are to the operation of the port, including a pager-based identification system that requires lorry drivers to provide specific release reference numbers to enter the port. London Thamesport also uses the Maritime Cargo Processing system to ensure that the release data for import or export container is pre-determined.

80. Ibid., p. 44.

81. Cowen, 'Geography of Logistics' (note 3) pp. 603–605.

82. Ibid.

83. IMO (note 3) p. 78.

84. Ibid., p. 77.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., p. 83.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., p. 89.

89. Bhattacharyya (note 7) p. 157.

90. Rushton et al. (note 34) p. 18.

91. It should of course be noted that pre-emptive action at the infrastructural level was central to the Israeli attacks on Gaza in December 2008; see S. Graham, 'Disruption by Design: Urban Infrastructure and Political Violence', in S. Graham (ed.), *Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails* (Abingdon: Routledge 2010) pp. 111–129.

92. Ó Tuathail, 'Political Geography III' (note 19) p. 82.